Abstract: This Article addresses a central question of climate adaptation in the United States: how can municipalities, which are best positioned to take a lead in climate change adaptation efforts, be incentivized to do so? The Article analyzes and ultimately rejects as doctrinally unmoored and counterproductive one idea that has been suggested by commentators and arguably endorsed in a few noteworthy recent cases-that is, that municipalities and other governments be held liable under the Takings Clause for their failing to take adaptive measures that protect private property. Instead, the Article argues that municipalities should be given an incentive to adapt by means of modifications in federal aid programs that in effect would require the municipalities to obtain private insurance against climate-change-related damage to public property and infrastructure. This proposal, if adopted, would be a salient first step toward the transformation of federal policy from one that actively discourages private adaptation to changing patterns of extreme weather and sea level rise to one that actively encourages such adaptation.
INTRODUCTION
Municipalities and other local governments will be central to how well, or not well, the United States adapts to climate change and its attendant increase in extreme weather, change in sea level, and flooding.
1 Given the very strong tradition of localism in the United States, and the need for adaptation to be tailored to conditions on the ground, an effective adaptation regime will © 2016, David Dana. All rights reserved. * Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Many thanks for helpful comments and assistance to Daniel Schwarcz and Christopher Serkin. Many thanks to Phillip Goodman for excellent research assistance.
1 For a succinct summary of climate change effects in the Unites States, see Future Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/future.html [https:// perma.cc/532T-VCZP] (stating that there is abundant evidence that sea level rise related to climate change will cause substantial flooding in parts of the coastal United States). Climate change is also associated with drought, extreme weather, and increased damage from wind and storm-related flooding. Id. See generally Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012) (summarizing sea level rise and its legal implications).
trinally sound nor good policy from the perspective of incentivizing adaptation. 9 By contrast, incentivizing municipalities to carry private insurance with respect to climate-related damage to public property and infrastructure could have a number of salutary effects: bringing third-party insurers in as de facto pro-adaptation regulators, sensitizing municipal leaders to climate change risks they otherwise might be motivated to ignore, and raising the costs of new development in those areas most susceptible to flooding and storm damage. Private insurance may lead to more adaptive building, rebuilding, and planning, and (in places) the retreat from flood-prone areas that climate change arguably calls for, at least from an overall social welfare perspective. 10 The current federal regime does not merely fail to incentivize localities to carry adequate private insurance for risks related to climate change.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster aid is configured in such a way as to affirmatively disincentivize localities to obtain insurance. 12 This disincentive should be removed. For third-party private insurance of municipalities in areas subject to flooding and other climate-related risks to be economically-viable, the pool of insureds cannot be limited to those municipalities at the greatest risk. If that were the case, insurers either will not enter the market or will soon exit it. Thus, a reasonably broad pool of municipalities must be incentivized to purchase insurance. Insurers' incentives to promote climate change adaptation also would be enhanced if state insurance law permitted, and the applicable federal incentive policy required, that flood insurance policies be issued on a five-year, ten-year, or longer basis. The largest obstacles to making the required changes in federal and state law will be ones of political economy and political will.
Because de jure mandatory or de facto mandatory insurance raises problems of affordability for less wealthy municipalities, some form of fed-eral government subsidies or support might be necessary, both as a matter of fairness and as a matter of political reality, even though such subsidies certainly are in tension with the goal of using insurance to motivate adaptation. Moreover, federal reinsurance guarantees may be needed to address private insurers' concerns about huge claims attached to Katrina-like storm activity. 13 The federal expenditures on insurance premium subsidies or reinsurance guarantees, however, would generate greater social welfare return than the current pattern of federal expenditures, which consists of ex post emergency aid and reconstruction funds that are provided whether or not municipalities have adequately sought to limit risk.
This Article does not address the question of incentivizing individual landowners and investors in particular localities, which has been much discussed in the context of calls for reform in federal and state flood insurance programs that (it is universally agreed) charge too low premiums and thus discourage adaptation.
14 The focus here on municipalities and hence municipal officials is justified in part because the role of federal law in failing to incentivize or actually disincentivizing their adaptation decisions has received comparatively less attention than the role of the federal government in disincentivizing individual property owners' adaptation via excessively cheap, government-operated insurance. But, of course, in order to move to a reasonably adaptive regime on the part of municipal officials, the incentives of individual property owners and investors must be addressed because, via local politics, individual property owners indisputably have a very large influence over the decisions of local officials.
Part I provides the legal background for the Takings ed States that would seem to provide a basis for that approach. 15 Part II explains why the various possible climatic takings claims are problematic in terms of both government and private property owner incentives. 16 Part III explains why the current post-natural disaster federal aid regime creates perverse incentives for municipalities to forego adequately insuring against flooding and other effects that may be tied to climate change. 17 It sketches options for reform and then considers objections to an approach to incentivizing adaptation by localities that relies on the greater use of private insurance.
I. THE BACKGROUND LAW AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TAKINGS
One way to conceptualize the Takings Clause is as a liability provision. And one function of liability-or the possibility of liability-is to incentivize socially desirable conduct or disincentive socially undesirable conduct. 18 For example, we hold builders liable for construction defects in part because we want to incentivize them to build safely. 19 Similarly, in theory (although perhaps not in reality, as discussed below), one can imagine that Taking Clause liability for the loss of private property via climate-changerelated sea level rise, flood, wind, fire, and such could motivate government actors to take actions to avoid or minimize the possibility of such property losses.
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But what, exactly, would takings claims against government actors related to weather patterns, sea level rise, flood, wind, and fire look like? There are at least four distinct categories of claims, each of which, ex ante, could incentivize somewhat different behavior on the part of government actors:
• Inaction Claims: Takings claims against governments for failing to take action to adapt to climate change. • Ineffective Action: Takings claims against governments for taking adaptive actions that were insufficient to prevent property loss.
• Counterproductive Action: Takings claims against governments for taking action that not only was ineffective in preventing property loss, but also caused greater losses than otherwise would have occurred.
• Improper Diversion: Takings claims against governments for diverting the effects of climate change, such as flooding or fire, from one area/community to another, such that the latter area/community incurred greater property losses than it otherwise would have incurred, although the former area/community incurred less loss then it otherwise would have.
At first blush, none of these claims would seem to fit the traditional paradigm of the Takings Clause, wherein the government is held liable for directly causing a loss of property that otherwise would not have happened. 21 Takings Clause jurisprudence requires the government to be both the but-for and the proximate cause of the property loss, but the claims outlined above do not comport with that causation requirement. 22 Governments-in any case particular local governments-do not cause extreme weather and sea level rise associated (or not) with climate change. 23 Governments do not singularly cause people to invest in areas at risk from climate-change-related flooding or other risks. Governments are not usually held liable for trying, but not fully solving, a problem they did not directly 21 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 22 18-20 (1879) . In Bowditch, although the city workers damaging property as part of a fire containment effort were the but-for cause of the damage, they were not the proximate cause, as it was the fire (and whoever set or caused the fire) that compelled the fire containment effort. Id.; see also Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 619-20 (2007) (dismissing takings claim related to Katrina flooding where the plaintiffs did not allege an affirmative action by the government that caused the flooding). 23 See Laitos & Abel, supra note 22, at 1182-83, 1238 (stating that to be responsible, the harm must be shown to be an "objectively foreseeable consequence of the initial act that eventually resulted in the harm").
cause: we would not imagine that a city would be held liable for burglaries it sought to prevent, but did not prevent, through policing.
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In the counterproductive action and improper diversion scenarios, the government arguably is a more active, more directly causal actor, in the property loss resulting from sea level rise or flooding or other climaterelated phenomena, but even in these scenarios, the government is merely endeavoring to protect property and (perhaps) life against a force-climate change and its effects-that are not directly of the government's making.
Nonetheless, even if holding governments liable for not doing enough or not doing the right things to address climate change effects seems to stretch our traditional notions of causal responsibility for takings purposes, it is not unprecedented in our overall legal tradition for liability to be imposed for not preventing harm as opposed to directly causing harm. 25 Our overall legal tradition is complex and not particularly consistent on the question of causal responsibility. This point is the beginning point of the passive takings argument put forth by Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School in a powerful and nuanced article arguing that the government's failure to act sometimes should give rise to liability under the Takings Clause for property losses the government did not but could have prevented.
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Professor Serkin's argument is partly based on doctrinal consistencyon the idea that Takings Clause liability based on inaction is consistent with liability imposed in other non-takings contexts for inaction-but he also appears to be arguing for passive takings in part out of a concern for incentivizing governments to take adequate action to adapt to phenomena such as climate change. 27 Climate change, and in particular sea level rise, is one of Serkin's central examples. 28 And Serkin suggests what is in a way an appealing "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" argument for the climate change context: since assertive government adaptation actions sometimes can result in Takings Clause liability (although the extent that is so or should be so is quite debatable), should not that disincentive to act be offset by an incentive to act in the form of potential Takings Clause liability for inaction or inadequate action? 29 24 Id. at 1210 (discussing the causation requirement for takings liability). 25 See Serkin, supra note 7, at 390 (describing government inaction as a basis for takings liability). 26 Id. at 346-49. 27 See id. 28 Id. To his credit, Serkin recognizes and addresses many of the potential objections to passive takings and, in particular, the objection that once inaction and inadequate action can be the basis for Takings Clause liability, governments might face an avalanche of litigation and liability that would overwhelm the courts and chill the operation of the executive and legislative branches. 30 That is so because it is almost always possible to imagine some action the government did not take that could have prevented a given property loss.
31 Given government's broad powers, there is always something more, in theory, it could have done. 32 Serkin tries to limit the government's obligation to act-and hence government liability for not acting-to contexts where the government had been heavily involved in the relevant regulatory and physical context affecting the property at issue, and thereby has implicitly assumed some measure of affirmative responsibility to act to protect the property's value. 33 It is not at all clear, however, that there is a logical way to cabin liability based on government inaction or inadequate action. 34 In the modern era at least, government has so much background involvement in the economy that there are few, if any, domains in which it could not be argued that the government had implicitly assumed an obligation to act. 35 In any case, in 35 For example, the financial, banking, and housing markets are in large part government creations, and hence, under a passive takings theory, whenever the government does not act to prevent losses in those markets, it arguably could be held liable for having taken property. If one the climate change context, there will never be a physical space where the government has not been highly involved, as a regulatory and physical matter. Virtually all of our rivers, oceans, and landscapes have been deeply affected by government action, and in many cases, they have been completely engineered or re-engineered by governments, along with private actors. Some American cities were essentially swamps before major public fill projects. 36 Governments have a long history of acting to control, manage, and direct flooding, including coastal flooding and storm-related flooding. Governments have also been intimately involved in addressing fire risks, many of which involve government-owned land. Thus, even in those cases (if there are any) where governments very recently have been wholly inactive in addressing climate-related flooding or other climate-related effects, one can conceptually broaden the relevant time-frame and characterize the government as having been an active participant and hence (in Serkin's conception) an actor that has assumed some obligation to take action to address climate change effects. 37 Moreover, given the political reality that governments almost always cannot afford to be seen as being wholly inactive with respect to risks such as flooding, even recent inaction on the part of governments almost always will be coupled with some recent action, even if only highly ineffective or perhaps symbolic action, to address the relevant risk. Thus, even if one can read Serkin's analysis as (in my terms) suggesting liability only for ineffective action and not pure inaction regarding climate change, a passive takings approach, if seized upon by the courts, might produce very far-reaching liability. 38 combines a relaxed conception of causal responsibility along the lines of passive takings and an expansive interpretation of "property" and property losses along the lines of Koontz, one could imagine an extremely expansive scope for takings liability that could in effect undo the postLochner consensus that courts will not scrutinize and second-guess routine economic regulation. 39 The most notable case in this regard grows out of the Hurricane Katrina disaster and the terrible flooding in the Lower Ninth Ward, in particular. 40 The damage caused by Katrina certainly reflected a long pattern of ineffective and counterproductive adaptation on the part of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as private actors. 41 The New Orleans landscape was transformed by public and private actors so that it was, and continues to be, highly vulnerable to flooding. 42 Well before Katrina, government actors knew of this vulnerability, as presumably did sophisticated private actors who continued to invest there anyway. 43 New Orleans is certainly a case of collective public and private failure, and it offers one of the more compelling cases one can imagine for the idea that the government, especially the federal government, should be held liable for ineffectively acting (and not acting at all) to address flooding risks that were well understood. 44 It is perhaps not surprising that the case that comes closest to endorsing a passive takings approach involved claims against the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") for having taken private properties in New Orleans via flooding during Katrina. 45 In St. Bernard Parish v. United States, plaintiffs argued that the Corps had built a canal that added to flooding risks, and then did not take enough subsequent actions to address that flooding risk. 46 In that sense, liability was predicated on government action coupled with inaction. 47 The Court accepted the plaintiffs' factual claim that the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet ("MR-GO"), a deep channel authorized by Congress and built by the Corps to improve navigation, caused environmental damage and funneled storm surges such that the plaintiffs' properties were inundated more than they would have been in the 39 46 Id. at 724-37. 47 Id.
absence of the MR-GO, and that instead of closing the MR-GO and/or taking other actions to abate storm damage and flooding, the Corps did next to nothing.
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But, as the United States argued in the litigation, the real problem with New Orleans at the time of Katrina was not the MR-GO per se, which was closed post-Katrina, but the fact that a range of actions over decades were not taken by the Corps, state and local governments, and private actors to address the risks of sea level rise and flooding notwithstanding a string of large pre-Katrina storms and reports stating that New Orleans was at risk.
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The MR-GO was not the only canal or other force degrading the environment and making private property more susceptible to flooding. 50 What actions that were taken on the part of government and private actors were far too little too late, not only with respect to the MR-GO, but also with respect to flood control systems and management as a whole. 51 One could thus perhaps read the Court's imposition of takings liability as implicitly about not just the MR-GO, but also the need for the government, at least the federal government, to be held liable when it acts ineffectively or refuses to act to address a clear flooding risk, even when the risk has many causes other than direct government action.
52 So read, St. Bernard Parish could be understood as endorsing not just a takings liability theory of (in my typology) counterproductive action but also inaction and/or ineffective action. 53 48 Id. at 746-47. 49 Id. at 741. 50 Even the Claims Court acknowledged that "causation is complicated by the mix of natural and man-made contributions to the flooding that Plaintiffs experienced" and that "[m]any of the areas that were wooded lowlands in the 1950s and 1960s are now developed, leveed, and drained[, and], canals other than MR-GO have been used for navigation, as well as to install gas pipelines and access well heads." Id. 51 Id. 54 These cases suggest a move toward a reduced causal requirement for takings liability, and hence are at least in the spirit of Serkin's passive takings approach. The United States via the Corps of Engineers has been repeatedly sued by private property owners whose land has been flooded as a result of flows from Corpsmanaged waters. 55 Traditionally, the courts held that temporary flooding could not constitute a taking, presumably because temporary flooding was either unavoidable or part and parcel of the Corps trying to manage excessive water flows during periods of heavy rains or some other external pressure requiring a management response.
56 Consistent with this traditional view, in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims found that the Corps had not taken flooded property when it flooded plaintiff's farmland as part of an effort to save the town of Cairo, Illinois from flooding as the flood waters managed by the Corps surged in the wake of heavy rains. 57 In effect, the Corps chose protecting a settlement over protecting essentially uninhabited farmland.
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But then came Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, a United States Supreme Court case that on its face seems quite innocuous, but that could be a building bridge to passive takings. 59 In Arkansas Game, the Supreme Court held that temporary flooding caused by federal management that favored one set of property owners over another set could constitute a taking if the flooding was foreseeable and exceeded the reasonable expectations of the landowners whose land was flooded. 60 took their property when the Corps diverted surging flood waters onto their farmland and other properties to reduce the risk of the levees in Baton Rouge and New Orleans from becoming overwhelmed and those major cities flooded. 63 In refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, the Federal Claims Court held that even a single, temporary flood could constitute a taking, depending on the "multi-factored, factually-intensive" analysis called for by Arkansas Game. 64 To be fair, none of these three cases-Arkansas Game, Big Oak Farms, Inc., or Quebedeaux-establish that governments will always be held liable as having taken property when they divert flood waters (or for that matter fires or ocean tides) away from one set of properties that would have been destroyed toward another set of properties as part of an effort to minimize the net social loss given the natural forces beyond the governments' control. 65 But the cases certainly suggest that governments may well be held liable even in such cases of apparently reasonable government behavior. In other words, there is now substantial precedential support for improper diversion takings claims related to climate change. 66 Taken together, Serkin's passive takings and Arkansas Game/Big Oak Farms, Inc./Quebedeaux provide some scholarly and case law support for the imposition of Takings Clause liability for inactive, ineffective, counterproductive, and/or improper diversion takings claims related to flooding and sea level rise (and more generally related to climate change effects). 67 These sources thus help frame the question: would the imposition of such liability result in better, more comprehensive climate change adaptation in the United States, and especially by local governments? As explained below, the answer seems to be likely not, and indeed quite the opposite may be true.
II. GOVERNMENT ACTOR INCENTIVES, TAKINGS LIABILITY, AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

A. What Motivates Government and the Limited Impact of Uncertain Future Takings Liabilities
As an initial matter, in asking the question of whether governments would act differently (and if differently, better or worse) if they faced Tak-ings Clause liability for doing too little by way of climate change adaptation or for diversions of floodwaters and tides from one area to another, it is necessary to ask: what motivates government actors who have control of decisions related to flooding and sea level rise and other climate-change risks? To be sure, there is unlikely to be a single answer to that question. In the United States, there will often be a large group of government actors from different governments that will play some role in the management and response to climate-related risks. 68 The federal government, notably, but not exclusively through United States Army Corps of Engineers, plays a large role, as do state and local governments. 69 Because climatic effects do not respect political boundary lines, a number of localities together may play a large role with respect to the relevant decisions in any particular geographic area. 70 Thus, in considering how the possibility of takings liability will affect government actors, a more refined inquiry compels us to ask: which government actors-and in what configuration-will be motivated by potential liability for inadequate or ineffective or improper adaptation and how?
The academic literature on the economics of takings liability provides a starting point but only a starting point. 71 In one strand of the academic literature, the government and government actors are viewed as budgetmaximizers and expenditure-minimizers, in a way analogous to classical economics' wealth-maximizing homo economicus. 72 But recent commentators have questioned the robustness of this account of governmental motivations. 73 70 The fact that many governments-federal, state, and local-in some sense may have failed to adapt in any particular location poses another problem for takings lawsuits. Presumably, defendants could sue a number of defendants, and the defendants could fight among themselves as to how to share any liability, but if liability were shared among many different governments, the ex ante incentive effects of such liability would be diluted. 71 ed ones but also ones reporting to or under the oversight of elected onesbecome such by gaining and maintaining political support, and are driven to keep that support to keep office. 74 Thus, government actors may act, and demonstrably do act, in ways that do not minimize government expenditures and may cost the government a great deal more than otherwise might be necessary when doing so maximizes political support. 75 Moreover, in many contexts, government actors need not be directly concerned with liabilities based on their actions because the liabilities will not necessarily come out of the budgets for which they are directly concerned. 76 As Professor Serkin has argued, however, small government localities and local officials may be more sensitive to financial liabilities than state or federal government actors. 77 Smaller localities may feel that their overall budgets are constrained and have little slack. At the state and federal level, the overall budgets are larger and deficit spending is commonplace. 78 For small governments, any new liabilities may require reductions in local services that the populace regards as essential, such as schools and police, with tremendous political costs. 79 It is thus arguable that local governments are not only sensitive to potential Takings Clause liabilities, but risk averse with respect to such potential liabilities. 80 But what is missing in the academic literature is any discussion of the time-frame and level of uncertainty of any such takings liabilities, and how those factors influence the extent to which such potential liabilities will motivate conduct by local government officials. Local officials in small localities may be very attentive to or even averse to imminent, near-certain liabilities, but not attentive to and certainly not risk averse to less immediate, quite uncertain liabilities. Human beings, of which government officials are a subset, and of which the electorate they must serve and please are another subset, discount costs that may be incurred in the future as opposed to those 74 Discounting may be particularly dramatic when the choice political leaders face is between bearing certain financial costs now with accompanying political costs-as, for example, the costs of cutting funding for a popular program-and the uncertainty that the locality will bear a liability at some point in the future if it does not expend the funds now used on the popular program to boost climate change adaptation. 84 A strong body of psychological scholarship supports the view that people tend to overweigh the avoidance of certain costs as compared to the avoidance of uncertain, albeit much larger, costs.
85 And, to be sure, there are numerous examples of governments, local and others, apparently putting off problems and potential liabilities to a future day out of an unwillingness to bear certain costs now. 86 In many states and localities, for example, local officials have refused to make spending cuts and impose taxes even though doing so has exposed their states and localities to millions or even billions of dollars in possible unfunded liabilities for public employee pensions.
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None of this is to suggest that possible takings liability, even whether and when (if ever) the liabilities will be incurred is very uncertain, cannot motivate government behavior. But the more uncertain the timing and actual imposition of such liability is, the less that the threat of liability is likely 81 See ALAN M. JACOBS, GOVERNING FOR THE LONG TERM: DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT 28 (2011) ("One common view of democratic politics suggests both a clear prediction of policy myopia and a clear explanation of it. Office-seeking politicians, in this view, must regularly appeal to short-sighted voters and thus face a strong incentive to mortgage the future for near-term benefits and to leave long-term problems to their successors."); see also JONATHAN BOS- TON In determining how to adapt to climate change and its effects, localities have a range of choices. Presumably, the kind of adaptation we want to incentivize is not necessarily adaptation that can easily be defended ex post in takings litigation: that is, concrete, highly visible, well-understood measures designed to protect property, as opposed to the measures that actually might have been more effective but that are less visible, less easily understood by lay people, less well-established, and hence less litigation-proof. 90 In ex post litigation, collaborative adaptation efforts where a number of jurisdictions rely on one another for disaster responses also may be more susceptible to second-guessing than adaptation programs where each locality acts as independently as possible. Thus, ex post, each government can document that its efforts were fully directed at its own citizens and their properties, even though collaboration would have been the most (or only) efficient approach to disaster preparedness.
For example, imagine that a town is considering a range of measures to address flooding, including highly engineered, long used methods like sea walls, but also less well-established methods like dune replenishment and replanting of coastal scrub and coastal construction setbacks. From some perspectives, the reliance on sea walls might not be optimal, given that sea walls may simply displace water to other communities, ultimately may be counterproductive in terms of erosion, and can endanger wildlife. 91 But, ex ante, local leaders may well think that a sea wall is arguably a better adapta- 88 See infra notes 111-119 and accompanying text. As discussed below, one advantage of requiring or inducing localities to carry third-party climate change insurance is that premiums are a current, certain cost and local leaders will be motivated to reduce premiums even if they generally discount highly uncertain future costs. tion measure to point to if they ever were to face takings litigation than a less readily understood and perhaps less-tested approach of using dunes and vegetation. 92 In general, effective adaptation is ultimately going to require a degree of creativity and experimentation on the local level, but, ex post, creativity and experimentation may simply appear to be inadequate adaptation. Therefore, ex ante, local leaders may adhere to methods they think could most readily be defended in litigation if takings claims based on inadequate adaptation are regarded as a realistic possibility.
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C. Motivating Distributive Inequities: Liability as a Disincentive to Adaptation That Protects Lower-Value Properties and Their Inhabitants
The overall governmental response to climate change and its effects involves difficult distributive choices, assuming, as one must, some limits on the available resources to address those effects. 94 Government officials may need to make distributive choices within a given political jurisdiction as to which areas will receive the greatest protection from climate change effects and which areas will receive the least. 95 In New York City, for example, there may be questions as to what kinds of adaptive investments to protect against sea level rise to make in Manhattan as opposed to Brooklyn, or in some parts of Manhattan as opposed to others. 96 The state, county, and city governments in Florida, a state dramatically threatened by climate change, also may face distributive choices about where resources should be concentrated to protect against the tides.
97 Distributive choices and consequences are also obviously in play when governments act to divert flood 92 Assuming that the relevant government actors are motivated to minimize their liabilities, takings liability for inadequate or ineffective adaptation or for improper diversion adaptation could skew government actors to favor wealthy areas in preference to less wealthy ones. 99 Given the greater vulnerability of owners and residents of less wealthy areas, that may be exactly the opposite of enlightened social policy. 100 Consider a simple hypothetical example. A locality has a budget of $1 million to invest in flood control protections. There is a wealthy part of the town and a poor part of the town, and the poor part actually faces greater flooding risk. But in the event of takings claims litigation for inadequate adaptation efforts, the potential liabilities for property losses in the wealthy area would be several orders of magnitude greater than the potential liabilities for property losses in the poorer areas. As a result, local leaders might invest relatively more in flood control in the wealthier areas and relatively less in the poorer areas than they would have in the absence of possible takings liability. Or consider a case like Big Oak Farms, Inc., in which the Corps is confronted with the choice of saving expensive farmland or saving a relatively impoverished town from flooding. 101 The property claims by the farmers might exceed those by the residents of the small town, but the disruption to community life and wellbeing might be greater if the town were flooded. To avoid greater takings liability, one could imagine the Corps choosing to allow the town to be flooded even though, in the absence of such liability, it would have opted to divert the waters toward farmland. 98 
D. Takings Liability as an Incentive for Residents and Investors to Engage in Non-Adaptive Building and to Oppose Local Adaptation Efforts
Just like local leaders, investors and property owners in areas at risk from climate change may simply discount future risks so much that their behavior is unaffected by those risks. 102 But for many property owners, their property is a large part of their overall wealth, and standard economic analysis would assume risk aversion with respect to such a key asset. And for sophisticated investors and property owners with large portfolios, while we might assume they are not risk averse with respect to any give asset, we might think they would behave somewhat like the economically rational wealth-maximizer of classical economic theory and attend to how climaterelated risks could affect their wealth. Thus, there is good reason to suppose that investors and property owners in areas known to face climate-changerelated risks would sometimes, if not always, take those risks into account to some degree in their decision-making.
And yet we know that people and corporations continue to build in areas at risk from flooding and rising tides, and that when they are allowed to, they sometimes build or maintain their structures in a way that does not mitigate the risk of water and wind damage. 103 This behavior may not be as perplexing as it seems when we take two factors into account. First, national and state flood insurance programs provide full property coverage at premiums that do not come close to reflecting the real flooding risks; insurance is also afforded structures that, in their current form and location, arguably should not be insurable at all. 104 Second, even when property owners do not have flood insurance, they can sometimes receive reconstruction and repair funding through state and federal programs, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s post-disaster Individual Assistance program. 105 It is not a requirement for receiving Individual Assistance that the structure had been adequately insured through government or private insurance. 106 Thus, government policy acts to invite people and corporations 102 See Howard Kunreuther et al., Overcoming Decision Bias to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 398, 398-413 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012) (stating that property owners in vulnerable areas may discount future risks, in part due to a belief that a large disaster will not occur, weighed against significant upfront costs). 103 See id. at 400-01 (discussing biases in temporal planning). 104 See id. at 399-400 (discussing how a family expecting to receive government relief after a loss has minimal incentive to invest in insurance). 105 See Assistance to Individuals and Households, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https:// www.fema.gov/recovery-directorate/assistance-individuals-and-households [https://perma.cc/Z4VW-EDFD] (discussing FEMA's treatment of individual assistance). 106 Id.
to-rationally, from their perspective-overinvest in areas at risk from climate change and underinvest in adaptive building and rebuilding. A change in takings doctrine to allow takings claims for inaction or inadequate or ineffective adaptation would only add to the moral hazard problem created by current government programs. 107 If investors knew that they could bring takings claims when their buildings were damaged from flood or fire based on government inaction or inadequate action, that would reduce their incentive to avoid or mitigate the risk in the first place. 108 The Takings Clause would provide a source of insurance-free insurance-on top of the insurance in the form of federally or state subsidized insurance and ex post disaster aid. 109 Because we might suppose that an understanding of the Takings Clause and an ability to litigate effectively generally will correlate with wealth and sophistication, we might anticipate that the possibility of bringing Takings Clause claims would in particular encourage larger, wealthier investors to take on more climate-related risk and invest less in mitigating that risk through adaptive building and rebuilding.
Moreover, the possibility of Takings Clause liability for inaction or inadequate action might encourage some investors and property owners to lobby local leaders against adopting climate change adaption measures that would limit the property owners' and investors' building plans or otherwise cost them money in the form of higher fees or taxes. Consider, for example, a company that owns undeveloped coastal property and that would like to build a resort and hotel there. The locality, let us assume, is considering adopting a plan for coastal protections against flooding that would cost millions of dollars in new taxes. In the absence of possible Takings Clause liability for inadequate adaptation, the company might support the coastal protection plan and the tax increases, even though the tax increases would reduce its near term return on its investment. But if the company knows that it could sue the town in the event that the town did not invest in coastal protection and flooding damaged its property, the company might conclude that the profit-maximizing strategy would be to lobby against the coastal protection plan and tax increase, or at least not to push for its adoption. In sum, the possibility of takings claims for inaction or inadequate adaptation might alter local political economy to make inaction or inadequate adaptation, at least on the margin, more likely.
III. OUR CURRENT INSURANCE REGIME, WHY IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
As explained above, using the threat of takings liability for the failure to adapt, or adapt adequately, to climate change would not produce the desired incentives. 110 But if the idea of Takings Clause liability for nonadaptation or ineffective adaptation to climate change by local governments is not sound social policy, the idea does bring into focus a real problem, namely, how can local officials be encouraged to engage in adaptation when their own judgment and local politics otherwise would not provide enough motivation?
One possible approach to encourage localities to invest in climate change adaptation would be to incentivize them to purchase private insurance against the effects of climate change-in the form of insurance for damages due to wind, flooding, and fire, notably-as regards property and infrastructure owned and operated by the locality and affiliated public entities, such as government buildings, bridges, roads, water collection distribution facilities, and electric power facilities.
111 There are several ways in which such insurance could incentivize climate change adaptation. 112 First, private insurers would require insured localities to pay premiums, and they presumably would require higher premiums from localities and for facilities in localities that seemed to have the greatest exposure to climate-related flooding and other climate-related effects. 113 To garner a lower premium, localities might be willing to make improvements at facilities or take other measures that would reduce risk, such as building or modifying buildings to protect them against possible water damage, in much the same way that a car owner might install safety devices or alarms in his or her car to qualify for a lower premium. 110 See supra notes 68-109 and accompanying text. 112 LINKIN, supra note 111, at 11 (discussing the ability of private insurers to enforce riskbased premium pricing). 113 Id. at 11, 21 (explaining how risk-based premium pricing will incentivize governments to mitigate risk).
For their part, insurers might play a role in studying and effectively disseminating information regarding what measures would reduce risk. 114 It would be rational for insurers of municipalities to support efforts to identify and promote means of reducing climate-related risks, because the better and greater the adaptation, the lower the potential insurance proceeds outlays would be. 115 Insurance, even when insurers do not offer advice as to how to lessen risk or offer premium reductions for risk mitigation, also may have a psychological effect by making certain risks more salient to municipal decision-makers. As a result, local officials may be more open to considering measures to address those risks. One might imagine that paying terrorism insurance premiums cannot but help focus one on the possible risk of terrorism-a risk that might not seem salient if one never had any direct contact with terrorism. Similarly, paying climate-change-related insurance for public infrastructure, in and of itself, may lead municipal officials to think about climate change risks that they simply would not think about otherwise, and/or to be less prone to dismiss such risks as too uncertain to warrant any attention. 116 Moreover, even in contexts where it is infeasible for localities to reduce risk through adaptive improvements so that they cannot lower the premiums they must pay, the premiums might have the function of making the costs of government operation and hence (presumably) taxes relatively higher in those areas where risks from climate change would seem to be greatest, and relatively lower elsewhere.
117 Thus, insurance premiums will tend to make investment relatively more expensive where climate change risks are greater, and thus might have the climate-change-adaptive effect of discouraging development in those areas at greatest risk from flooding and other climate change effects. 118 Municipal insurance, in other words, would promote allocative efficiency in the era of climate change.
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This Part first details what we do and do not know about municipal insurance practices.
120 It then reviews the Federal Emergency Management 114 Id. (describing the private insurance industry's incentive to increase transparency of information and data to help the government mitigate risk). 115 See id. 116 McCarthy, supra note 111 (explaining that "the industry may also help insureds and governments adapt to climate change" through, among other things, incentives from risk-based premium pricing).
117 LINKIN, supra note 111, at 27 (discussing the influence of risk-based premium pricing to discourage investment in risky areas). 118 See id. 119 See id. 120 See infra notes 124-158 and accompanying text.
Agency (FEMA) Pubic Assistance program and argues that it effectively discourages the purchase of private insurance related to climate change effects and hence also discourages, at least to a degree, adaptation. 121 The Part then proposes two reforms: one admittedly politically unrealistic, which is a legal mandate that localities purchase flood and other relevant insurance in coastal areas and other areas broadly at some risk from climate-related effects; and one perhaps more politically realistic, that FEMA post-disaster public assistance to localities and/or federal flood insurance for individual owners be conditioned on localities' having privately and very adequately insured public buildings and infrastructure. 122 Finally, this Part considers some objections to the approach of greater reliance on private insurance to incentivize adaptation by local governments. 123 
A. Municipal Insurance Practices and FEMA Policies
There is not a great deal known about the practices of municipalities in insuring against risks as a general matter. As Professor Serkin notes, municipal insurance is not well studied, perhaps because it sounds like a dry subject. 124 It is also likely the case that localities vary a great deal in their approach to insurance, so making generalizations is difficult.
What we do know is that municipalities do insure against at least some kinds of risks, especially tort liability risks. 125 Private insurance is available from traditional private insurance companies. In many states, localities have joined together to form insurance pools that operate, in effect, like thirdparty insurers with respect to their individual municipal members. 126 And some municipalities, especially larger ones, purport to self-insure against risks, either using explicit reserve funds or through less formalized arrangements. 127 The risks most obviously posed by climate change-flooding risk and wind/hail damage risks in coastal areas-are not part of standard property insurance policies at all or are subject to high, percentage-based deductibles. 128 It seems likely that many municipalities do not purchase enough, or any, special insurance that would address flood and wind damage to public property and infrastructure. There is notably an absence of information available on the internet and web pages of major insurance companies regarding private flood insurance for public entities and governments. For its part, the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") has no special insurance program geared toward public infrastructure, and there is no evidence that localities do seek to purchase flood insurance as part of the NFIP commercial building insurance program.
The Emmett Center policy paper notes that "many municipalities selfinsure" against the risks relevant to climate change, but it does not provide any data regarding how many municipalities self-insure against such risks, or how adequately they do so. 129 Most adaptation plans from major cities contain no discussion of insurance; one notable exception, Boston's adaptation plan, does call for self-insuring against the possible effects of climate change by setting money aside for that purpose. 130 And it may be that other self-insuring cities are also setting aside money for climate-change-related risks. But even if this is true, it is unclear what self-insurance really means in particular cases, absent an explanation of how cities calculate the amounts that must be reserved for such self-insurance, how those amounts can be held secure and available for later use, or how the self-insurance is to be administered. 131 Self-insurance only works when there are safeguards from having the self-insurance fund tapped to meet more pressing, immediate needs, and of course many localities have pressing, immediate needs. Politicians-and not just local ones-may have a tendency to put the immediate need over the less immediate risk when push (and politics) comes to shove. 132 As one commentator explained:
Everyone always has good intentions from the get-go, but the question is, do you have the discipline? . . . . It's a minority of towns that it's actually an option for. You have to be big, you have to have an appetite for risk, you have to have good controls in place and you have to have the discipline.
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To the extent that localities do not currently insure adequately against climate-related risks, one reason may be that the federal government affirmatively creates a disincentive for them to do so. 134 FEMA's public assistance program discourages the purchase of adequate private insurance by providing federal funding to state and local governments for climate-related damages with few strings attached.
facility as a condition of receiving disaster assistance."
141 But even then, the insurance required need only cover the hazard and the dollar amount of damage for which disaster assistance was received. 142 There is no general requirement that a locality carry comprehensive and adequate flood or wind insurance for all its insurable property and infrastructure.
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FEMA public assistance ("PA") can be used to address a range of expenses incurred as a result of flooding and/or extreme weather.
144 PA provides funding to grantees for the repair and restoration of damaged public and eligible private nonprofit facilities, for emergency measures taken to protect lives and property, and in support of disaster-related debris removal. 145 When PA is authorized, such assistance may be provided for Debris Removal; Emergency Protective Measures; Repair of Roads and Bridges; Water Control Facilities; Public Buildings; Public Utilities; and Other Facilities. 146 The prerequisite for a locality obtaining PA (or individuals obtaining individual assistance ("IA")) is that the locality falls within an area designated as a major disaster or emergency area. 147 A state governor must request a declaration that areas within his or her state are natural disaster or emergency areas, and, in theory, the declaration decision rests with the President's discretion. 148 In practice, decisions about PA are channeled through 141 Id. 142 See id. 143 See id. Moreover, although the wording of FEMA documents is somewhat ambiguous, it would seem that FEMA does not require localities to obtain insurance for items not normally and regularly insured for damage as part of standard commercial property policies-roads and bridges, for example. See id. (listing as insurable risks from FEMA's perspective buildings, contents of buildings, vehicles, and equipment). Indeed, even as to conventionally insurable items, and even after aid for the repair of those items has once been received from FEMA, FEMA is statutorily limited in demanding full insurance coverage as a condition of future aid because the Stafford Act provides: "In making a determination with respect to availability, adequacy, and necessity under paragraph (1), the President shall not require greater types and extent of insurance than are certified to him as reasonable by the appropriate State insurance commissioner responsible for regulation of such insurance." 42 U.S.C. § 5154. And states have an incentive to not certify that their localities can and reasonably should obtain more insurance than they currently do, because that would only increase local costs while in effect reducing the costs borne by federal taxpayers who live outside the state. 144 While there is variation in the number of declarations per year, the average number in recent years has been sixty, excluding pure emergency and fire emergency declarations (which also allow for the payment of PA and IA). 150 In 2011, there were ninety-nine declarations. Many of the declarations relate to the sort of natural disasters associated with climate change, notably flooding and severe storm damage. 151 For example, in 2014, fortyfour of eighty-four declarations have involved flooding, and in part of 2015, forty of the seventy-seven declarations involved flooding, according to FEMA. ities. 155 For large disasters, PA may only account for a modest fraction of payments to localities.
There is no direct evidence that local leaders consciously forego wind, flood, or other insurance for public property and infrastructure in part because they know federal (and state) funding will be forthcoming in the event of major flooding or a severe storm. But given how well-entrenched our regime of federal funding for major disasters is, it is plausible that the availability of such ex post aid figures into their thinking, at least to the extent that they realistically focus on the threat of climate-related flooding and extreme weather.
The Heritage Foundation has come closest to a moral hazard critique of the Public Assistance Program, which it criticizes as part of the overfederalization of disaster preparedness and response in the United States. 156 The Heritage Foundation has called for decreasing the share for Public Assistance below seventy-five percent, and for reducing the discretion on the part of the federal government to exceed the default share of federal funding. 157 But Heritage has not addressed the role private insurance should or could play in addressing the incentives for localities created by PA. 158 As suggested below, increasing the state and local share of recovery funding would not be as effective as requiring more adequate insurance because, ex ante, a higher share requirement would not introduce pressure from a third party (private insurers) to engage in risk mitigation. Additionally, ex post, a state or locality could always claim that it thought it had reserved enough funding to meet its ex post share, but that it does not in fact have enough money. It would be very difficult, as a political matter, for the federal government to refuse to assume funding for what should have been the state's share.
B. Possible Reforms
Assuming that it would be productive in terms of climate adaptation for localities to carry private insurance, and that, without prompting, most will not, what are the possibilities for changing the status quo? For such insurance to work, localities with a range of risk exposures would need to insure; otherwise, insurance could never be profitable, as only those at risk would select insurance, and they would be the ones most apt to have large claims. 159 Moreover, because the effects of climate change ultimately will be broad, there are benefits in incentivizing adaptation even among those localities that are not at the most immediate, identifiable risk. 160 Thus the question, slightly refined, is: what are the possibilities for changing the status quo such that most or all coastal localities and localities in flood plains and otherwise vulnerable areas seek insurance?
One approach would be for Congress to outright mandate such insurance coverage, but that would be widely regarded as an unacceptable intrusion by the federal government into a traditional state regulatory domain (insurance) and would have no political traction. 161 For their part, states could require localities in floodplains and coastal areas and otherwise vulnerable locations to carry property insurance that protected their property and infrastructure from flooding and wind damage. A state-by-state approach, however, would require gaining political support for the reform in many separate jurisdictions. And, in many states, there is a strong tradition of deference to localities in the management of their affairs, and, increasingly, of reliance on the federal government to cover disaster-related expenses. 162 Overall, this approach would be at best slow and quite possibly altogether infeasible.
Another possibility would be to tie an insurance mandate to federal benefits. The most direct approach here would be to require that any locality that is eligible for FEMA PA to carry adequate flood and wind insurance for damage if the locality is in a coastal area, floodplain, or other vulnerable area. To the extent localities took this requirement seriously and did not be- 159 Heal & Kunreuther, supra note 13, at 235-45 (discussing the impact from large claims on private insurer profitability). 160 lieve that they would receive aid even if they failed to obtain insurance and to the extent that the local leaders perceived any risk of needing PA funds after a natural disaster, this requirement could be a powerful incentive. 163 Even for local leaders who might not take concerted action to address climate-change-related effects, if left to their own devices, perhaps because they discounted future uncertain risks heavily, affirmatively making the choice to render their locality formally ineligible for PA might be a difficult choice to publically defend, and hence one they would not want to make.
From the perspective of the federal government, and Congress in particular, an insurance requirement tied to PA eligibility arguably would be appealing because it might constrain total federal outlays, thereby making more money available for other federal projects of interest to members of Congress. 164 There has, in fact, been concern and debate in Congress about FE-MA spending. 165 And while there is a strong tradition of federal deference to state and local government control over local affairs, 166 there is also a strong tradition of federal conditions on federal aid.
Another possible approach to an insurance requirement would be to tie a locality having insured its property and infrastructure adequately to the availability of national flood insurance for individual private property owners in the locality. Under FEMA regulations, a locality's individual property owners qualify for national flood insurance if their locality adopts a floodplain management ordinance that meets FEMA's minimum standards. 167 As FEMA explains:
Joining the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is an important step toward reducing a community's risk of flooding and making a speedier, more sustained recovery should flooding occur. 163 See Adamski et al., supra note 162, at 3 (discussing how the safety net of federal aid can affect a locality's incentive to obtain insurance). 164 It also allows property owners within a participating community to purchase NFIP flood insurance . . . . [M]ore than 22,000 communities have already agreed to adopt and enforce floodplain management ordinances that provide flood-loss reduction building standards for new and existing development. 168 FEMA's requirements for a satisfactory ordinance are not particularly demanding, but they do provide a precedent for conditioning access to the NFIP for individual property owners on a locality obtaining fully adequate private insurance for its insurance and infrastructure. One potential objection to this proposal for greater private insurance of local government property and infrastructure against flood and similar risks is that private insurers will refuse to write such insurance and participate in that market. Notably, private insurers in recent years have been withdrawing from the private property flood insurance market in some parts of the country at greatest climatic risk, out of fear of huge claims liability. 170 If that is the case, why would we anticipate that private insurers would cover public property and infrastructure on a much larger scale than they currently do, and in particular, in those localities facing greatest risks of flooding and other climate-related effects?
In fact, there are reasonable reasons for hesitance on the part of private insurers, as commentators have explained in discussing the obstacles to expanding private flood insurance for private property. 171 For one thing, insur-ers prefer to set rates based on a large data set from which they can accurately estimate future claims. In the context of extreme weather and flooding, accurate data is difficult to come by, in part because of inadequate data collection and assessment by government, but also because there is a limited but highly variable number of storm events per year and the effect of climate change in the near term is very hard to accurately factor into any model. 172 Moreover, insurers are traditionally conservative in the sense that they do not want to risk being unable to pay claims and face possible bankruptcy, and the nature of extreme weather and flooding is such that there is always a possibility of a year with extraordinarily large claims that would exhaust the insurer's financial capacity. 173 Moreover, insurers are heavily regulated by state authorities and may be justifiably concerned that state regulators will not allow them to charge the rates they believe are necessary, or to deny such insurance altogether once they have entered the market. 174 These concerns notwithstanding, there is good reason to think that private insurers would expand their coverage to encompass a large number of localities' properties if there were market demand for such insurance-and, of course, there would be market demand if there were a legal mandate or strong legal incentives for localities to obtain such insurance. Modelling of flood and other risks has improved to the point that realistic premiums can now be estimated. 175 Insurance markets and products that were thought to be economically infeasible or impractical have in fact been developed once market demand materialized for one reason or another. 176 The insurance industry has a long history of creativity and innovation when there is a market opportunity.
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Having said that, private insurance for localities might be facilitated by a government promise to insure the localities that have too high risk a profile or lack the financial ability to cover insurance premiums, although such coverage should come with strict qualification requirements and safeguards so that the moral-hazard-reducing benefits of an insurance requirement are not subverted. The federal government could also ease insurer concerns by a government guarantee of reinsurance to backstop private insurers against unusually great claims liability in a given year, or by trying to locate private investors willing to assume the reinsurance risk. In general, the federal government could support and facilitate expansion of private insurance for localities in the same ways that the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") and others have suggested the federal government could, in theory, support expansion of private insurance for private property owners. 
Insurers Will Not Promote Adaptation
Another concern is that even if private insurers do insure localities against flood and wind risks and the like, the insurers will not encourage risk mitigation by insureds and financially encourage insureds to engage in greater risk mitigation. And, in fact, we do not have much direct evidence that insurers will encourage risk mitigation in the flood and storm context. . 177 See Cohen et al., supra note 176, at 1901. 178 The GAO identified the following as means to facilitate private insurance for flooding:
The federal government could also encourage private sector involvement by providing coverage for the highest-risk properties that the private sector is unwilling to insure. Providing residual coverage could increase the program's exposure relative to the number of properties it insured, but NFIP would be insuring fewer properties, and charging adequate rates could reduce taxpayer costs . insurers. 179 There is mixed evidence as to whether private flood insurers in Germany encourage risk mitigation, and the relevance of the German experience to the United States is debatable. 180 Outside the context of private flood and similar insurance for which we have limited or no relevant evidence, however, there is ample evidence of insurers encouraging risk mitigation by insureds. 181 As Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle Logue argue, insurance is a market-based means of ex ante regulation of risk that is largely taken for granted in such fields as automobile safety, workplace safety, and household safety. 182 As they explain, "workplace safety is regulated at least as much by workers' compensation liability insurers as it is by Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulators; and household safety is regulated as much, if not more, by homeowners' insurance than it is by municipal regulators." 183 As Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther, and Matthew White document, there was a dramatic decline in leaks from underground fuel tanks in certain states when those states required gas stations to carry private clean-up and liability insurance. 168 They explain that "the price structure for market-based insurance gives tank owners economic incentives to invest in equipment that reduces the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks." 184 Environmental liability insurers outside oil and gas offer discounts for firms that implement environmental management systems that help detect and address possible risks and that they do not, adjust regulatory requirements accordingly.
189 Undoing changes to constitutional doctrine are, by contrast, not readily or quickly achieved, which is another reason why takings doctrine should not be employed as the vehicle to incentivize greater government adaptation efforts.
CONCLUSION
Climate change adaptation is essential for the United States, as climate change and its effects are, to an extent, inevitable. The sea will rise and extreme weather will become more commonplace even if the nations of the world, collectively, are able to reduce their current annual emissions of greenhouse gasses. Local governments and local officials will need to play a key role in climate change adaptation, and hence it is important that they are properly incentivized to do so. But reconfiguring traditional Takings Clause doctrine to allow takings claims for inaction, inadequate/ineffective adaptation, improper diversion of floodwaters, and the like would not create the right incentives for local officials or investor/property owners, and indeed could be highly counterproductive. By contrast, FEMA reform to promote greater reliance on private insurance offers the promise of encouraging adaptation without creating counterproductive incentives or destabilizing established constitutional law doctrine.
